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In each country, labor is used in either production or research and de-
velopment (R&D) which increases the probability of the improvement
of production technology. The production of goods in any country
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1 Introduction
In this study, I examine optimal emission policy in a union of several coun-
tries. In each country, labor can be used in either production or research
and development (R&D) which increases the probability of the improvement
of production technology. The production of goods in any country incurs
emissions that are spread all over the union. A household’s utility in any
country depends positively on his personal consumption and negatively on
total emissions in the union. This study attempts to find out the Pareto-
optimal emission taxes for the countries.
To solve the problem, I introduce a local government for each country and
a central government for the union as a whole. A local government maximizes
the welfare of a typical household in the country and it has enough instrument
to control the allocation of resources in the country. The central government
maximizes the welfare of a typical household in the whole union and attempts
to control the emissions of the countries by emission taxes. There is policy
externality between the countries in a dynamic environment.
The impact of any environmental policy depends crucially on the exis-
tence of uncertainty. Because governmental activities influence not only the
expected values of economic variables, but also their volatility, many papers
consider public policy within a stochastic growth model where productity
shocks follows a Wiener process.1 Soretz (2003) applies this approach to en-
vironmental policy. In this study, I choose a different approach and assume
that uncertainty is directly embodied in technological change.
There is some literature on policy externality with pollution in an eco-
nomic union. Philippopoulos and Economides (2003) consider a union com-
posed of a number of countries as follows. In each country, private agents
consume, save in domestic capital and produce goods from capital with con-
stant returns to scale. Pollution occurs as by product of output produced
and decreases welfare. Philippopoulos and Economides show that the type
of policy externality from one country to another changes from positive into
negative, when capital accumulation is introduced into the model: the tax
on externality is too low without, but too high with capital accumulation. In
this study, I show that the tax on externality remains too low, after dynamics
1Cf. Turnovsky (1993, 1995, 1999), Smith (1996) and Corsetti (1997).
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is introduced in the form of R&D.
Reis (2001) examines the case where welfare depends on emissions and
R&D increases the probability that at some moment in the future a technol-
ogy is discovered that will eliminate emissions.2 She shows that the hope of
discovering such a technology (measured by the probability of the discovery)
increases the optimal rate of growth. However, the optimal rate of growth
remains smaller than in an economy without emissions. In this study, I show
that the optimal growth rate is an increasing function of the productivity of
labor in R&D that improves finding a new emission-saving technology.
Beltratti et al. (1994) introduce a growth model where an environmental
asset is a source of utility and depleted by a pollution process which is linked
to consumption. They define the concept of the Green Golden rule as the best
sustainable configuration, i.e. the path that gives the highest maintainable
level of instantaneous utility. Ayong Le Kama (2001) transforms this model
by linking the pollution process to production. Following these papers, I
search for the Green Golden for the economic union.
Sections 2 and 3 present the basic structure of the model. Section 4
ignores the welfare effects of pollution and examines the Cournot-Nash case
where the local government maximizes take each other’s emissions as given.
In section 5, this model is generalized for the case where local governments
form expectations on each other behavior. Finally, in section 6, the basic
model is extended for the case where emissions have long term effects through
pollution. In all cases, the solution method is dynamic programming of
Poisson jump processes. These models provides a lot of challenges for both
economists and mathematicians.
2 The union
I consider an economic union that consists of fixed number n of similar coun-
tries. Each country j ∈ {1, ..., n} produces a different good. Competitive
firms produce a consumption good from all n goods through Cobb-Douglas
2Reis calls emissions as “the flow of pollution”.
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technology:
y =
n∏
j=1
y
1/n
j , (1)
where y is total consumption in the union and yj is output in country j.
3
Given this technology, the true consumption price is the minimum unit cost
of consumption, p =
∏n
j=1 p
1/n
j , where pj is the output price in country j.
Normalizing the consumption price at unity yields
1 = p =
n∏
j=1
p
1/n
j . (2)
The union employs aj labor units j in country in abatement activities.
The level of abatement, X, is a Cobb-Douglas function of these labor inputs,
X =
∏n
j=1 aj.
4 The absorbtion rate of pollution, h, is the higher, the more
there are abatement activities relative to the level of pollution:
h(x), x
.
=
X
P
=
1
P
n∏
j=1
a
1/n
j , h
′ > 0. (3)
Following Michel and Rotillon (1995), I assume that emissions m accumulate
pollution P , but pollution absorbtion takes place at the rate h(x):
P˙
.
=
dP
dt
= m− h(x)P, (4)
where t is time. The elasticity of the absorbtion rate of pollution is given by
ε
.
=
X
h
dh
dX
=
X
hP
h′ > 0. (5)
Assume that (i) all households in the union share the same preferences,
and (ii) total emissions in the union, m, and the degree of pollution in the
union, P , decrease a household’s welfare in all countries. In country j, the
3With some complication, the same results can be generalized for any neoclassical
production function with constant returns to scale.
4With some complication, the same results can be generalized for any neoclassical
production function with constant returns to scale.
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representative household’s utility from an infinite stream of its consumption
cj, emissions m and pollution P beginning at time T is then given by
U(cj,m, P, T ) = E
∫ ∞
T
u(cj,m, P )e
−ρ(t−T )dt with
ρ > 0,
∂u
∂cj
> 0,
∂u
∂m
< 0,
∂u
∂P
< 0, (6)
where E is the expectation operator, ρ the constant rate of time preference
and u the level of instantaneous utility. Because it is impossible to find any
analytical solution for the general case (6) in Bellman’s dynamic program-
ming, we specify the instantaneous utility function in the form
u(cj,m, P )
.
= cσjm
−δP−ν , 0 < σ < 1, δ > 0, ν ≥ 0, (7)
where σ, δ and ν are constants. The ratio 1/(1 − σ) can be interpreted
also as the household’s constant rate of risk aversion. Following Beltratti
et al., (1994) and Ayong Le Kama (2001), I define the Green Golden Rule
(GGR) as the path of the union that gives the highest maintainable level of
instantaneous utility (7) in all countries j.
3 A single country
In country j, there is a fixed labor supply L, of which the amount lj is used
in production, the amount aj in abatement activities and the rest zj in R&D:
L = lj + aj + zj. (8)
The productivity of labor in production, lj, in country j is A
γj , where A > 1
is a constant and γj is the serial number of technology. In the advent of
technological change, this productivity increases from Aγj to Aγj+1. The
total output of the consumption good in country j is therefore given by
yj = A
γj lj. (9)
In equilibrium, the wage wj is equal to the marginal product of labor:
wj = pj
∂yj
∂lj
= pjA
γj . (10)
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Emissions in country j, mj, are in fixed proportion to labor input in
production in that country, lj. By a proper choice of units,
mj = lj (11)
holds true and total emissions in the whole union are given by
m
.
=
n∑
j=1
mj =
n∑
j=1
lj. (12)
The improvement of technology in country j depends on the labor zj
devoted to R&D. I assume that in a small period of time dt, the probability
that R&D leads to development of a new technology is given by λzjdt, while
the probability that R&D remains without success is given by 1− λzjdt,
where λ is the productivity of labor in R&D. This defines a Poisson process
dqj =
{
1 with probability λzjdt,
0 with probability 1− λzjdt, (13)
where dqj is the increment of the process qj. Technological change (13) gen-
erates economic growth. Noting (8), the average growth rate of productivity
Aγj in the stationary state is equal to
E
[
log Aγj+1 − log Aγj] = (logA)λzj, (14)
where E is the expectation operator.5 Because in the stationary state labor
devoted to production, lj, is constant, the average growth rate of consumption
(9) in the stationary state is also given by (14). Because this growth rate is
in fixed proportion (logA)λ to R&D, zj, one can use labor devoted to R&D,
zj = L− lj − aj, as a measure for the rate of economic growth.
There are governments at two levels: a central government for the union
as a whole, and a local government for each country. The central government
attempts to control the emissions of the countries by emission taxes. To keep
the model simple, I specify taxation as follows.6 The central government
imposes the tax wjτ on all emissions mj and pays the subsidy wjb to all
labor L and the wage wj for labor in abatement, aj, in country j, where τ
5For this, see Aghion and Howitt (1998), p. 59.
6With this specification, the growth rates of different countries are independent.
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and b are policy parameters and wj is the wage in that country. Thus, noting
(9), (10) and (11), I obtain the household’s budget constraint in country j
as:
cj = pjyj + wjaj − wjτmj + wjbL = pjAγj [(1− τ)lj + aj + bL]. (15)
The central government’s budget constraint is given by
b
n∑
j=1
wjL+
n∑
j=1
wjaj = τ
n∑
j=1
wjmj = τ
n∑
j=1
wjlj, (16)
where b
∑n
j=1wjL is total labor subsidies,
∑n
j=1wjaj total costs in abatement
activities and τ
∑n
j=1wjmj total emission taxes in the union.
4 The basic model
Assume for a while that utility (7) is independent of pollution P , ν = 0. In
such a case, there is no need for abatement activities and aj = 0 for all j.
4.1 The local governments
I assume that the local government in the union behave in Cournot-Nash
manner. The government of country j then maximizes the utility of coun-
try j’s representative household (6) subject to (7), (8), (12), (13) and (15),
holding the output price pj, the tax parameter τ , the subsidy parameter b
and the emissions by the other countries, l−j
.
=
∑
ι 6=j mι =
∑
ι 6=j lι, constant.
The value of the optimal program starting at time T for country j is then
Γj(l−j, γj, τ, b, pj, T ) = max
(cj , lj , zj) s.t. (8),(12),(13),(15)
E
∫ ∞
T
cσjm
−δe−ρ(t−T )dt
= max
(cj , lj , zj) s.t. (8),(13),(15)
E
∫ ∞
T
cσj (lj + l−j)
−δe−ρ(t−T )dt
= max
(lj , zj) s.t. (8),(13)
E
∫ ∞
T
pσjA
σγj [(1− τ)lj + bL]σ(lj + l−j)−δe−ρ(t−T )dt. (17)
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The Bellman equation corresponding to this optimal program obtains7
ρΓj(l−j, γj, τ, b, pj, T ) = max
(lj , zj) s.t. (8) and aj = 0
Φj(zj, lj, l−j, γj, τ, b, pj, T )
= max
lj
Φj(L− lj, lj, l−j, γj, τ, b, pj, T ), (18)
where
Φj(zj, lj, l−j, γj, τ, b, pj, T )
= pσjA
σγj [(1− τ)lj + bL]σ(lj + l−j)−δ
+ λzj
[
Γj(l−j, γj + 1, τ, b, pj, T )− Γj(l−j, γj, τ, b, pj, T )
]
.
This leads to the first-order condition
∂Φj
∂lj
=
[
(1− τ)σ
(1− τ)lj + bL −
δ
lj + l−j
]
pσjA
σγj [(1− τ)lj + bL]σ(lj + l−j)−δ
− λ[Γj(l−j, γj + 1, τ, b, pj, T )− Γj(l−j, γj, τ, b, pj, T )] = 0. (19)
To solve the dynamic program, I try the solution that the value of the
program, Γj, is in fixed proportion ϑj > 0 to instantaneous utility c
σ
jm
−δ:
Γj(l−j, γj, τ, b, pj, T ) = ϑjcσjm
−δ = ϑjpσjA
σγj [(1− τ)lj + bL]σ(lj + l−j)−δ.
(20)
This implies
Γj(l−j, γj + 1, τ, b, pj, T )/Γj(l−j, γj, τ, b, pj, T ) = Aσ. (21)
Inserting (20) and (21) into the Bellman equation (18) yields
1/ϑj = ρ+ (1− Aσ)λ(L− lj) > 0. (22)
This is constant, if in equilibrium labor input lj is constant. Inserting (20)
and (21) into the first-order condition (19) yields
(Aσ − 1)λ =
[
(1− τ)σ
(1− τ)lj + bL −
δ
lj + l−j
]
1
ϑj
=
[
σ
lj + bL/(1− τ) −
δ
lj + l−j
][
ρ+ (1− Aσ)λ(L− lj)
]
. (23)
7Cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
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4.2 Equilibrium
Because of the symmetry over all countries j = 1, ..., n, it is evident that in
equilibrium lj = l and l−j =
∑
ι 6=j lι = (n − 1)l for all j ∈ {1, ..., n}. The
more countries (i.s. the bigger n), the more decentralized decision making in
the union. From the budget constraint (16), lj = l and aj = 0 it follows that
b = τ
n∑
j=1
wjlj
/ n∑
j=1
wjL = τ
l
L
. (24)
Given this, the equilibrium condition (23) takes the form
1 =
[
σ
l + bL/(pj − τ) −
δ
nl
][
ρ/λ
Aσ − 1 − L+ l
]
=
[
σ
1 + τ/(1− τ) −
δ
n
][(
ρ/λ
Aσ − 1 − L
)
1
l
+ 1
]
=
[
(1− τ)σ − δ
n
][(
ρ/λ
Aσ − 1 − L
)
1
l
+ 1
]
.
Solving for l leads to the equilibrium level of emissions as:
l =
[
1
(1− τ)σ − δ/n − 1
]−1(
ρ/λ
Aσ − 1 − L
)
,
dl
dn
> 0. (25)
Given (1) and (9), the consumption good is produced as follows:
c
.
=
1
n
n∑
j=1
cj =
1
n
Aγ
n∏
j=1
l
1/n
j =
l
n
Aγ, γ
.
=
1
n
n∑
j=1
γj, (26)
where the serial number of the consumption-good technology. Because the
improvement of productivity in country j follows the Poisson process (13),
noting (14) and (26), I obtain
E
[
log Aγ+1 − log Aγ] = 1
n
n∑
j=1
E
[
log Aγj+1 − log Aγj] = logA 1
n
n∑
j=1
λzj
= (logA)λz.
This means that in the production of the consumption good the improvement
of productivity follows the Poisson process q with8
dq =
{
1 with probability λz dt,
0 with probability 1− λz dt. (27)
8Cf. also Wa¨lde (1999).
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4.3 The central government
Noting (12) and (26), the welfare of the representative household in the union
takes the form
U(c,m, T ) =
∫ ∞
T
cσm−δe−ρ(t−T )dt =
∫ ∞
T
Aσγn−σ−δlσ−δe−ρ(t−T )dt, (28)
Because the central government is able to control labor input in production,
l, by the tax τ , it maximizes welfare (28) by l subject to technological change
(27). Noting (26), the value of its optimal program starting at time T is
Γ(γ, T ) = max
l s.t. (27)
E
∫ ∞
T
Aσγn−σ−δlσ−δe−ρ(t−T )dt. (29)
The Bellman equation corresponding to this optimal program obtains
ρΓ(γ, T ) = max
l
{
Aσγn−σ−δlσ−δ + λ(L− l)[Γ(γ + 1, T )− Γ(γ, T )]}. (30)
This leads to the first-order condition
∂{}
∂l
= (σ − δ)Aσγn−σ−δlσ−δ−1 − λ[Γ(γ + 1, T )− Γ(γ, T )] = 0. (31)
To solve the dynamic program, I try the solution that the value of the
program, Γ, is in fixed proportion ϑ > 0 to instantaneous utility:
Γ(γ, T ) = ϑAσγn−σ−δlσ−δ. (32)
This implies
Γ(γ + 1, T )/Γ(γ, T ) = Aσ. (33)
Inserting (32) and (33) into the Bellman equation (18) yields
1/ϑ = ρ+ (1− Aσ)λ(L− l) > 0. (34)
Inserting (32) and (33) into the first-order condition (31) yields
(Aσ − 1)λ = σ − δ
l
1
ϑ
=
σ − δ
l
[
ρ+ (1− Aσ)λ(L− l)]. (35)
Given (35), I solve for the Pareto-optimal solution
l∗ .=
( 1
σ − δ − 1
)−1( ρ/λ
Aσ − 1 − L
)
. (36)
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Note that, given (8), (36) and a = 0, labor input to production, l∗, falls and
that to R&D, z = L − l∗, rises, when the productivity of labor in R&D, λ,
increases. This result is in line with Reis (2001).
The central government sets the tax τ so that this Pareto optimum is
established, l = l∗. Noting (25) and (36), one then obtains (1− τ)σ− δ/n =
σ − δ and τ = (1− 1/n)δ/σ. This result can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 1 The optimal emission tax for country j is given by
τwj =
(
1− 1
n
) δ
σ
wj,
where wj is the wage in that country. This tax is the smaller, the more
decentralized the union (i.e. the bigger n). When the number of countries is
large, n→∞, the tax is equal to δ
σ
wj.
Note that if dynamics is based on R&D, the tax on externality (here emis-
sions) is too low and decreases with a larger number of countries. This
reverses the result of Philippopoulos and Economides (2003) who introduce
dynamics in the form of capital accumulation.
5 Flexible strategic dependence
In the basic model, the countries took the levels of each other’s decision vari-
ables as given in optimization. This Cournot-Nash assumption is of course a
simplification. Dixit (1986) generalizes this setting through the assumption
that each agent forms expectations on the others’ prospective responses to
its action. This idea can be applied for emission games as follows.
Assume that country j anticipates the other countries ` 6= j to increase
their emissions m` by the constant β ∈ (−∞, 1) percentages, when the coun-
try itself increases its emissions by one percentage. This and (11) imply
lj
l`
dl`
dlj
=
mj
m`
dm`
dmj
= β for all ` 6= j. (37)
Given this, l−j
.
=
∑
` 6=j l` and (18), the first-order condition (19) for country
10
j changes into
dΦj
dlj
=
∂Φj
∂lj
+
∑
` 6=j
∂Φj
∂l`
dl`
dlj
=
∂Φj
∂lj
+ β
∑
` 6=j
∂Φj
∂l`
l`
lj
=
∂Φj
∂lj
+ (n− 1)β∂Φ
j
∂l`
l`
lj
=
∂Φj
∂lj
− (n− 1)βδjpσjAσγjj [(1− τ)lj + bL]σ(lj + l−j)−δ−1
l`
lj
=
{
(1− τ)σ
(1− τ)lj + bL −
[1 + (n− 1)β]δ
lj + l−j
}
pσjA
σγj
(lj + l−j)δ
[(1− τ)lj + bL]σ
− λ[Γj(l−j, γj + 1, T )− Γj(l−j, γj, T )] = 0. (38)
Inserting (20) and (21) into the first-order condition (38) yields
(Aσ − 1)λ =
{
σ
lj + bL/(pj − τ) −
[1 + (n− 1)β]δ
lj + l−j
}[
ρ+ (1− Aσ)λ(L− lj)
]
.
(39)
Noting (24), the equilibrium condition (39) takes the form
1 =
{
(1− τ)σ −
[ 1
n
+
(
1− 1
n
)
β
]
δ
}[(
ρ/λ
Aσ − 1 − L
)
1
l
− 1
]
.
Solving for l leads to the equilibrium level of emissions as:
l =
{
1
(1− τ)σ − [1/n+ (1− 1/n)β]δ − 1
}−1(
ρ/λ
Aσ − 1 − L
)
. (40)
The central government sets the tax parameter τ so that this Pareto optimum
is established, l = l∗. From (40) and (36) it then follows that
(1− τ)σ − [1/n+ (1− 1/n)β]δ = σ − δ
and τ = (1− β)(1− 1/n)δ/σ. This result can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 2 The optimal emission tax for country j is given by
τwj = (1− β)
(
1− 1
n
) δ
σ
wj,
where wj is the wage in that country. This tax is the lower (higher) than
in the tax in proposition 1, if a local government anticipates that the oth-
ers will respond to its increase in emissions by increasing (decreasing) their
emissions, β ∈ (0, 1) (β ∈ (−∞, 0)).
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6 Pollution
In the basic model, emissions had no long-term effects on welfare. If the level
of emissions is increased for a period, then it decreases welfare only for that
period but no longer. I now introduce long-term effects through pollution
and assume ν > 0.
6.1 The local governments
Noting (3) and (12), the accumulation of pollution (4) takes the form
P˙ = lj + l−j − h(X/P )P, X =
n∏
ι=1
a1/nι . (41)
The government in country j maximizes the utility of country j’s represen-
tative household (6) subject to (7), (8), (12), (13), (15) and (41), holding the
output price pj, the tax parameter τ , the subsidy parameter b, abatement ac-
tivitiesX, and the emissions by the other countries, l−j
.
=
∑
ι 6=j mι =
∑
ι 6=j lι,
constant. The value of the optimal program starting at time T for country
j is then
Γj(l−j, X, γj, P, τ, b, pj, T )
= max
(cj , lj , zj) s.t. (8),(12),(13),(15),(4)
E
∫ ∞
T
cσjm
−δP−νe−ρ(t−T )dt
= max
(cj , lj , zj) s.t. (8),(13),(15),(4)
E
∫ ∞
T
cσj (lj + l−j)
−δP−νe−ρ(t−T )dt
= max
(lj , zj) s.t. (8),(13),(4)
E
∫ ∞
T
pσjA
σγj [(1− τ)lj + bL]σ(lj + l−j)−δP−νe−ρ(t−T )dt.
(42)
The Bellman equation corresponding to the optimal program obtains
ρΓj(l−j, X, γj, P, τ, b, pj, T )
= max
(lj , zj) s.t. (8)
Ψj(zj, lj, l−j, X, γj, P, τ, b, pj, T )
= max
lj
Ψj(L− lj − aj, lj, l−j, X, γj, P, τ, b, pj, T ), (43)
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where
Ψj(zj, lj, l−j, X, aj, γj, P, τ, b, pj, T )
=
pσjA
σγj
(lj + l−j)δP ν
[(1− τ)lj + aj + bL]σ + ∂Γ
j
∂P
(l−j, X, aj, γj, P, τ, b, pj, T )P˙
+ λzj
[
Γj(l−j, X, aj, γj + 1, P, τ, b, pj, T )− Γj(l−j, X, aj, γj, P, τ, b, pj, T )
]}
.
This and (41) lead to the first-order condition
∂Ψj
∂lj
=
[
(1− τ)σ
(1− τ)lj + aj + bL −
δ
lj + l−j
]
pσjA
σγj
(lj + l−j)δ
[(1− τ)lj + aj + bL]σP−ν
− λ[Γj(l−j, X, aj, γj + 1, P, τ, b, pj, T )− Γj(l−j, X, aj, γj, P, τ, b, pj, T )]
+
∂Γj
∂P
= 0. (44)
To solve the dynamic program, I try the solution that the value of the
program, Γj, is in fixed proportion ϑj > 0 to instantaneous utility:
Γj(l−j, X, γj, P, τ, b, pj, T ) = ϑjpσjA
σγj [(1− τ)lj + aj + bL]σ(lj + l−j)−δP−ν .
(45)
This implies
Γj(l−j, X, aj, γj + 1, P, τ, b, pj, T )/Γj(l−j, X, aj, γj, P, τ, b, pj, T ) = Aσ,
∂Γj/∂P = −νΓj/P. (46)
Inserting (45) and (46) into the Bellman equation (43) yields
1/ϑj = ρ+ (1− Aσ)λ(L− lj − aj) + νP˙ /P > 0. (47)
Inserting (45) and (46) into the first-order condition (44) yields
(Aσ − 1)λ =
[
(1− τ)σ
(1− τ)lj + aj + bL −
δ
lj + l−j
]
1
ϑj
− ν
P
=
[
σ
lj + (aj + bL)/(1− τ) −
δ
lj + l−j
][
ρ+ (1− Aσ)λ(L− lj − aj) + ν P˙
P
]
− ν/P. (48)
With symmetry throughout j = 1, ..., n, lj = l, l−j = (n − 1)l and aj =
a = X holds true. Noting this, the budget constraint (16) changes into
b =
(
τ
n∑
j=1
wjlj −
n∑
j=1
wjaj
)/(
L
n∑
j=1
wj
)
=
τ l − a
L
,
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and the equilibrium condition (48) takes the form
1 =
[
(1− τ)σ − δ
n
][(
ρ/λ
Aσ − 1 − L+ a
)
1
l
+ 1 +
ν/λ
Aσ − 1
P˙
P l
]
− ν/λ
Aσ − 1
1
P
.
(49)
I consider this equilibrium only in the stationary state where the union has
attained its equilibrium level of resource, P˙ = 0 and
hP = lj + l−j = nl. (50)
Inserting this into (49), I obtain
1
(1− τ)σ − δ/n =
(
ρ/λ
Aσ − 1 − L+ a
)
1
l
+ 1− hν/λ
Aσ − 1
1
nl
1
(1− τ)σ − δ/n
=
{
1/λ
Aσ − 1
[
ρ− hν/n
(1− τ)σ − δ/n
]
− L+ a
}
1
l
+ 1.
Solving for l leads to the equilibrium level of emissions in the stationary state:
l =
[
1
(1− τ)σ − δ/n − 1
]−1{
1/λ
Aσ − 1
[
ρ− hν/n
(1− τ)σ − δ/n
]
+ a− L
}
.
(51)
6.2 The central government
Noting (12) and (26), the welfare of the representative household in the union
takes the form
U(c,m, T ) =
∫ ∞
T
cσm−δP−νe−ρ(t−T )dt =
∫ ∞
T
Aσγn−σ−δlσ−δP−νe−ρ(t−T )dt,
(52)
The central government maximizes this welfare by labor inputs in production
and abatement activities, (l, a), subject to technological change (27) and the
dynamics of pollution (41). Noting (26), the value of the optimal program
starting at time T for the central government is
Γ(γ, P, T ) = max
(l, a) s.t. (27),(41)
E
∫ ∞
T
Aσγn−σ−δlσ−δP−νe−ρ(t−T )dt. (53)
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The Bellman equation corresponding to this optimal program obtains
ρΓ(γ, P, T ) = max
l,a
{
Aσγn−σ−δlσ−δP−ν +
∂Γ
∂P
P˙
+ λ(L− l − a)[Γ(γ + 1, P, T )− Γ(γ, P, T )]}
= max
l,a
{
Aσγn−σ−δlσ−δP−ν +
∂Γ
∂P
[
nl − h
( a
P
)
P
]
+ λ(L− l − a)[Γ(γ + 1, P, T )− Γ(γ, P, T )]}. (54)
This leads to the first-order conditions
∂{}
∂l
= (σ − δ)Aσγn−σ−δlσ−δ−1P−ν + n ∂Γ
∂P
− λ[Γ(γ + 1, T )− Γ(γ, T )] = 0,
∂{}
∂a
= − ∂Γ
∂P
h′ − λ[Γ(γ + 1, T )− Γ(γ, T )] = 0. (55)
To solve the dynamic program, I try the solution that the value of the
program, Γ, is in fixed proportion ϑ > 0 to instantaneous utility:
Γ(γ, T ) = ϑAσγn−σ−δlσ−δP−ν . (56)
This implies
Γ(γ + 1, T )/Γ(γ, T ) = Aσ, ∂Γ/∂P = −νΓ/P. (57)
I consider this equilibrium only in the stationary state where P˙ = 0 and (50)
hold true. Inserting (32) and (57) into the Bellman equation (18) yields
1/ϑ = ρ+ (1− Aσ)λ(L− l − a) > 0. (58)
Inserting (50), (56) and (57) into the upper first-order condition (55), one
obtains
(Aσ − 1)λ = σ − δ
l
1
ϑ
− n
Γ
∂Γ
∂P
=
σ − δ
l
[
ρ+ (1− Aσ)λ(L− l − a)]− n ν
P
=
{
(σ − δ)[ρ+ (1− Aσ)λ(L− l − a)]− hν}1
l
and
l = (σ − δ)
(
ρ/λ
Aσ − 1 − L+ a
)
− hν/λ
Aσ − 1 . (59)
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Given (35), I solve for the Pareto-optimal solution
l∗ .=
( 1
σ − δ − 1
)−1( ρ/λ
Aσ − 1 − L+ a−
1
σ − δ
hν/λ
Aσ − 1
)
=
( 1
σ − δ − 1
)−1[ 1/λ
Aσ − 1
(
ρ− hν
σ − δ
)
− L+ a
]
.
(60)
The central government sets the tax parameter τ so that this Pareto optimum
is established, l = l∗. From (51) and (60) it then follows that
τ =
(
1− 1
n
) 1
σ
[
δ + (1 + δ − σ)hν
(
ρ− hν − λ L− a
Aσ − 1
)−1]
.
(61)
Thus, the following result is obtained:
Proposition 3 The optimal emission tax for country j that leads to the
Green Golden Rule is given by τAγj , where τ is determined by (61). This tax
is the smaller, the more decentralized the union is (i.e. the bigger n). When
the number of countries is large, n→∞, the tax is equal to
δ
σ
Aγj
[
δ + (1 + δ − σ)hν
(
ρ− hν − λ L− a
Aσ − 1
)−1]
.
Inserting (5), (50), (56) and (57) into the lower first-order condition (55),
one obtains
(Aσ − 1)λ = − 1
Γ
∂Γ
∂P
h′ =
ν
P
h′ = ν
εh
X
= ν
εh
a
.
Solving for a yields the following result:
Proposition 4 The optimal labor input devoted to abatement activities is
a∗ =
νεh
(Aσ − 1)λ.
7 Generalizations
The model can be extended in the following directions:
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1. In the basic model, all countries are of equal size. One can assume that
some of the countries are relatively bigger than the others. In such
a case, the bigger countries can be considered as Stackelberg leaders,
which take the optimal responses of the others into account in their
optimization, and the smaller countries as Stackelberg followers, which
take the levels of emissions in the bigger countries as given.
Technical difficulty: Asymmetry in the model leads easily to multiple
equilibria which complicates the interpretation of the results.
2. In the basic model, technological knowledge does not spill over to other
countries. One can introduce technological diffusion so that investment
in R&D in one country improves productivity also in the other coun-
tries. This creates an additional externality.
Technical difficulty: The strategic inter-dependence of the countries
becomes more complex.
3. In the basic model, all income is consumed. One can introduce an asset
which is accumulated by private saving. This asset could be capital or
internationally-traded bonds.
Technical difficulty: the accumulation of the asset is a differential equa-
tion which enters as an constraint in the optimization and thereby
complicates the construction of the value function.
4. In the basic model, output is made from labor only. Output can be
produced from both labor and capital according to a neoclassical tech-
nology. Emissions can be complementary to labor, capital or output.
Following Turnovsky (1993, 1995, 1999), Smith (1996), Corsetti (1997)
and Soretz (2003), one can also introduce productivity shocks that fol-
lows a Wiener process.
Technical difficulty: Nonlinearity in the production function compli-
cates the construction of the value function. The optimization of a
Poisson process will be replaced by that of a Poisson-Wiener process,
to which it is challenging to form a value function.
17
8 Conclusions
This paper introduces a model that provides a variety of applications for
mathematicians who are specialized in optimal control theory as well as
means for economists to solve practical problems in economic integration
and environmental policy. The results are expressed in the form of Pareto-
optimal emission taxes. These leads to the best sustainable configuration
(e.g. the Green Golden Rule) in the steady state. The optimal taxes can be
estimated by a data over wages and household preferences.
18
References:
Aghion, P., and Howitt, P. (1998) Endogenous Growth Theory. Cambridge
(Mass.): MIT Press.
Ayong Le Kama, A. (2001) “Sustainable Growth, Renewable Resources and
Pollution.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 25: 1911–1918.
Beltratti, A., Chichilnisky, G., and Heal, G.M. (1994) “Sustainable Growth
and the Green Golden Rule.” In: Goldin, I., and Winters, L.A. The Eco-
nomics of Sustainable Development. Cambridge (U.K.): CUP Press.
Corsetti, G. (1997) “A Portfolio Approach to Endogenous Growth: Equilib-
rium and Optimal Policy.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 21:
1627–1644.
Dixit, A. (1986) “Comparative Statics for Oligopoly.” International Eco-
nomic Review 27: 107–122.
Dixit, A., and Pindyck, K. (1994) Investment under Uncertainty. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Michel, P., and Rotillon, G. (1995) “Disutility of Pollution and Endogenous
Growth.” Environmental and Resource Economics 6: 25–51.
Philippopoulos, A., and Economides, G. (2003) “Are Nash Tax Rates too
Low or too High? The Role of Endogenous Growth in Models with Public
Goods.” Review of Economic Dynamics 6: 37–53.
Reis, A.B. (2001) “Endogenous Growth and the Possibility of Eliminating
Pollution.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 42: 360–
373.
Smith, W.T. (1996) “Feasibility and Transversality Conditions for Models of
Portfolio Choice with Non-Expected Utility in Continuous Time.” Economic
Letters 53: 123–131.
Soretz, S. (2003) “Stochastic Pollution and Environmental Care in an En-
dogenous Growth Model.” The Manchester School 71: 448–469.
Turnovsky, S.J. (1993) “Macroeconomic Policies, Growth, and Welfare in a
Stochastic Economy.” International Economic Review 34: 1–31.
Turnovsky, S.J. (1995) Methods of Macroeconomic Dynamics. Cambridge
(Mass.): MIT Press.
Turnovsky, S.J. (1999) “On the Role of Government in a Stochastically Grow-
ing Economy.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 104: 275–298.
19
